

HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

Edited by

Kristine L. Fitch

University of Iowa

Robert E. Sanders

University at Albany, SUNY



2005

LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOCIATES, PUBLISHERS
Mahwah, New Jersey

London

Conversation Analysis

Paul Drew
University of York

PROLOGUE: TOMA'S PARADOX

Periodically over the past century or so, scholars—as well as the press and filmmakers—have been fascinated by the discovery of what came to be known as feral children or *enfants sauvages*. These were children found in circumstances of the cruelest deprivation, for instance, often chained and locked away in attics since their earliest childhood, kept in squalor and darkness, fed like animals, and deprived of any human intercourse. They lived in a kind of mute bestiality. In some extreme cases, children were discovered living wild, as it seemed, running with the wild beasts in the forest. They were deprived, therefore, to varying extremes, both physically and emotionally. The scholarly interest centered largely on one of the consequences of their having been deprived of human contact and interaction—namely, their inability to speak. Typically they made grunts and other animal-like sounds, contributing further to their being considered *sauvage*. But they did not appear to possess language. This lack provided the conditions of a kind of natural experiment that could never otherwise have been conducted into whether language is innate: These children's inability to speak and converse seemed relevant to the question of whether the ability to use language is genetically “wired in” or whether it was acquired through the environment of socialization.¹ And if the latter, was there a critical age up to which children could, and indeed had to, learn language, if they were ever to be able to speak normally?

¹For a brief review of such cases, and the scientific interest in them concerning language development, see Brown (1958, pp. 186–193).

The results of attempts to teach such children how to speak, and the interpretations of those results in terms of the dichotomy between innate and learned behaviour, need not concern us here. But recently, in August 2000, a case was reported in the media that involved a kind of mirror reflection of the phenomenon of *enfants sauvages*. This was the discovery in a Russian psychiatric hospital, to which he had been admitted 56 years earlier, of Andras Toma, who, it emerged, had been fighting during the Second World War for the Hungarian army when in 1944 he was taken prisoner by Soviet forces. In 1947 he was moved from a prisoner-of-war camp to the psychiatric hospital where he was found. In that time Andras Toma had not learned any Russian; as a consequence he had not, so far as it is known, spoken to anyone in over half a century. When he was repatriated toward the end of August 2000, he did not remember who he was or where he came from or apparently recall anything about his life prior to the war and his incarceration (though certain things that he said provided clues that led to the identification of his home town and to his being reunited with his brother and sister). Press reports were quite specific about how, in the days following his repatriation to Hungary, he was enjoying conversation for the first time since 1945, but that “Unused to the give and take of conversation, he seldom answers direct questions.” As an example, a doctor caring for him reported, “I asked him what his name was, and instead of answering he just said: ‘We used to put beer underground to keep it cold.’”²

In what is the reverse of *enfants sauvages*, as a child Toma learned a native language quite normally. However, because his fellow patients, warders, and doctors did not speak Hungarian and he did not learn Russian, during his adult life, from shortly after he was taken prisoner (at about the age of 19), Toma was deprived of speaking in interaction with people. The result of this deprivation was that although he was eager to converse, he seemed to have at least temporarily lost the skill to do so. He could not follow a topical thread, he seldom answered direct questions, or when he did his “answers” were off-topic: His talk seemed to be following his own thoughts instead of being connected with what others were saying or asking. Toma’s paradox appears to have been this: He had the psychological disposition to talk; he was eager to converse. He had the linguistic ability to talk; he spoke Hungarian, although his pronunciation was often old-fashioned. And yet he was unable at first to hold a conversation—he had forgotten the norms and expectations of interacting with others in a conversation.

Toma’s paradox illustrates a key theme in the study of conversation: Although in some respects conversation lies at the intersection between psychology, linguistics, and sociology, engaging in a conversation requires more than knowledge of and the ability to use a language, and more than the psychological disposition to interact with others. It requires that speakers participate in ways that are consistent with the social organization of conduct in conversation. When, now aged about 75, Toma spoke to others for the first time in his adult life, he almost literally spoke his mind: He simply spoke about whatever came into his mind, mostly memories of the army. But engaging in conversation involves, among other things, speaking in appropriate ways, at appropriate moments, and coherently, that is, in ways that fit with what others say. These are the social competencies we

²This information is taken from reports in *The Times*, 25th August 2000; the Radio Netherlands Web site, 4th August 2000; and a Guardian report published in *The Russia Journal* on their Web site later that year. All quotations are taken from *The Times* report, 25th August, p. 14.

acquire along with sheer linguistic abilities. And these competencies consist in the knowledge of the patterns, routines, and rules of conversation, which we share as members of a communicative culture. This chapter reviews some of what has been uncovered about the social organization of conversation, which we use without much effort or reflection, but which Toma so poignantly seemed to have forgotten.

INTRODUCTION

In some respects, conversation analysis (hereafter CA) is a misnomer for the perspective that is the subject of this chapter. It developed initially out of a broader inquiry Harvey Sacks was engaged in the very early 1960s concerning whether a stable, reproducible, cumulative, natural observational science of social action, and hence of society, was possible, and if so, how it could be conceived.³ In the course of attempting to find a way to ground sociological description in the “details of actual events,” Sacks sought the materials that would support such an inquiry (Sacks, 1984, p. 26); what came to hand, through the circumstance of his being a Fellow of the Center for the Scientific Study of Suicide, in Los Angeles (1963–1964), were recordings of telephone calls made to the center. Sacks, together with his collaborator Emanuel Schegloff, did not set out with the aim of studying language or interaction, and certainly not conversation. It just happened to be a form of conduct which was directly accessible, and, because it was recordable, the very details of actual social events and conduct could be captured in their entirety and replayed, inspected, and re-examined as often as one liked.⁴ The study of conversation, therefore, was for Sacks, Schegloff and others part of the larger enterprise of building a science of social action.

CA is a misnomer for another, perhaps more literal, reason. It is really a method of analysis, one that is not restricted in its application to ordinary conversation; instead it can be applied to all forms of talk-in-interaction. Many of the forms or genres of talk⁵ in which we engage in daily life would not usually be considered conversation: When being examined by a doctor, answering questions as part of a mass survey, appearing as a witness in court, contributing to a business meeting or industrial negotiation, talking with one’s psychiatrist, participating in a seminar or teaching a classroom lesson, one is not having a conversation. Nevertheless, the method of CA and its perspective on the sequential organization of talk are equally as applicable to these other forms or genres as they are to ordinary conversation (see, for instance, Drew & Heritage, 1992; Drew & Sorjonen, 1997; Heritage, 1997). However, because the application of CA to these other institutional forms of talk-in-interaction is considered by Heritage in his chapter in this volume, we will focus here only on ordinary conversation.

Why study conversation at all? What makes conversation worth studying in the kind of detail I shall review, and more especially, how has a perspective, almost a subdiscipline, come to be established on the basis of the study of what is after all only one form of talk-in-interaction, and according to some, a rather insignificant form?

³For an authoritative account, see Schegloff (1992a, especially pp. xxxii–xxxiv).

⁴For an account of which, see also Heritage (1984a, especially pp. 234–238).

⁵See especially Bergmann (1993).

To begin with, conversation might be regarded as the primordial site of social life: It is largely through conversation that we are socialized, through which institutional organizations such as the economy and the polity are managed, and through which we manage our ordinary social lives. This view has been most eloquently argued by Schegloff, as here:

I take it that, in many respects, the fundamental or primordial scene of social life is that of direct interaction between members of a social species, typically ones who are physically co-present. For humans, talking in interaction appears to be a distinctive form of this primary constituent of social life, and ordinary conversation is very likely the basic form of organization for talk-in-interaction. Conversational interaction may then be thought of as a form of social organization through which the work of the constitutive institutions of societies gets done—institutions such as the economy, the polity, the family, socialization, etc. It is, so to speak, sociological bedrock. And it surely appears to be the basic and primordial environment for the development, the use, and the learning of natural language. (Schegloff, 1996a, p. 4)

There are two senses of *primordial* in what Schegloff says here. The first, quite explicitly, is that all forms of social organization are, to a greater or lesser extent, managed through conversation between persons. The second is more implicit: All other forms of (e.g., institutional) talk-in-interaction are transformations of ordinary conversation, which is therefore the comparative measure against which other forms of talk-in-interaction can be examined. Thus conversation is “a kind of benchmark against which other more formal or ‘institutional’ types of interaction are recognized and experienced. Explicit within this perspective is the view that other ‘institutional’ forms of interaction will show systematic variations and restrictions on activities and their design relative to ordinary conversation” (Drew & Heritage, 1992, p. 19). So ordinary conversation can be considered the most fundamental form of talk-in-interaction, the form from which all others derive.

It is worth developing the point that it is through conversation that we conduct the ordinary affairs of our lives. Our relationships with one another, and our sense of who we are to one another, is generated, manifest, maintained, and managed in and through our conversations, whether face-to-face, on the telephone, or even by other electronic means (Hutchby, 1998; also see Hutchby, this volume). The chapter (this volume) by Pomerantz and Mandelbaum develops further how people construct, establish, reproduce, and negotiate their identities, roles, and relationships in conversational interaction. For the present, I want to highlight the part that social actions play in the management of our daily lives. In our interactions with others, we don’t just talk; conversation is not, to adapt Wittgenstein’s phrase, “language idling.” We are doing things, such as inviting someone over, asking them to do a favor or a service, blaming or criticizing them, greeting them or trying to get on first-name terms with them, disagreeing or arguing with them, advising or warning them, apologizing for something one did or said, complaining about one’s treatment, sympathizing, offering to help, and the like. These and other such activities are the primary forms of social action, as real, concrete, consequential, and as fundamental as any other form of conduct. That such actions as

these—for instance, inviting, complaining, and disagreeing—are at the heart of how we manage our social relationships and affairs hardly needs explanation. So when we study conversation, we are investigating the actions and activities⁶ through which social life is conducted.

Interaction of any kind is made possible through participants sharing certain communicative competencies. These consist partly of knowledge about the language, of the ways that elements of the language (including lexis, grammar and syntax, intonation, prosody, etc.) are put together and deployed. But they include, most crucially, knowledge also of the structures, patterns, norms, and expectations that Toma had so manifestly forgotten. Such knowledge is not, generally, something of which we are aware at any conscious level. It is, however, salient to participants in interaction in their establishing a mutual understanding of what they are saying and doing in the talk. Thus the coherence of talk, and the mutual understandings that underlie it, rest on a “common set of methods or procedures” (Heritage, 1984a, p. 241); and these in turn are the constituents of our basic communicative competencies. So when we study conversation, we are attempting to discover the essential and quite fundamental competencies that we share and that make all communication possible between members of a culture.

These competencies, or as Pomerantz and Mandelbaum refer to them in their chapter, sense-making practices, consist of the practices and devices which are the focus of CA research. That is, the aim of research in CA is to discover and explicate the practices through which interactants produce and understand conduct in conversation. These practices are uncovered, in large part, through identifying patterns in talk. Here is one such example of a pattern and of the practice it reveals.

- #1 [Field:X:(C):1:1:1:6]
- 1 Les: I don't know'f you remember Missiz Milbeck th't
2 use to go to chu:rch.
3 (0.8)
- 4 Mum: (Mi[ssiz]
5 Les: [Uh: uh-he wz the vicar's ward'n anyway he
6 die:d suddenly this week .hhh and he wz still
7 wo:rking.
8 (0.3)
- 9 Mum: ([])
10 Les: [He was seventy ni:ne,
11 (0.3)
- 12 Mum: My: wo:rd?
13 (0.2)
- 14 Les: Y[e:s he: was um
15 Mum: [(You've got s'm rea:l) wo:rkers down the:re,
16 heh
17 Les: .hhh He wz a p- uh: Ye:s. Indee:d .hh He wz a

⁶All I mean by the distinction between actions and activities is that the former are utterance/turn level; an action is performed in a turn, whereas an activity consists of a series of connected actions managed over the course of a sequence of turns.

- 18 (0.2) .p a buyer for the hoh- i-the
 19 only horsehair fact'ry left in England.
 20 Mum: Good gracious,
 21 (0.3)
 22 Les: And he wz their buyer,
 23 (.)
 24 Mum: Hm::
 25 Les: .t
 26 Mum: Hm:
 27 Les: + So he had a good inni:ngs did[n't he.
 28 Mum: [I should say so:
 29 Ye:s.
 30 (0.2)
 31 Mum: Marvellous,
 32 Les: + .tk.hhhh Anyway we had a very good evening o:n
 33 Saturda:y.

In this extract in a telephone call between a middle-aged woman, Lesley, and her mother, Lesley is telling about a mutual acquaintance (line 1) who has recently died. She summarizes his long and full life with the figurative expression *had a good innings* (line 27), to which Mum assents (lines 28/29 and 31), after which Lesley introduces in line 32 a new and quite different topic. This sequence has been shown to have a recurrent aspect (Drew & Holt, 1998), a pattern systematically associated with changes of topic in conversation. The pattern consists of the use of a figurative expression to summarize and thereby close down the topic, followed by agreement by recipient (or a brief exchange of agreements), after which one or other participants opens a quite new topic (generally marked as unconnected with the previous one, as here when Lesley prefaces her turn in line 32 with *Anyway . . .*). From this pattern, we can see that using a figurative expression to summarize what has been said is a practice through which speakers can initiate the termination of a topic and the transition to a next topic. This pattern reveals something new about the interactional function of a linguistic form (here, a figure of speech): The sequential pattern illustrated in #1 reveals a practice through which speakers can move to new topics—a practice that is therefore part of their interactional competence as users of a language. Through the way in which the sequence pattern illustrated in #1 is organized, we see that the properties of language and linguistic forms are related to social interactional contingencies and tasks. So we study conversation to find in discernible sequential patterns or organizations the practices that make communication in general, and conversation in particular, possible.

These, then, are some of the reasons for studying conversation: It is the primordial site of sociality, it is through activities managed in conversation that we conduct our ordinary social affairs, and the practices to be found in the highly organized structures and patterns in conversation underlie our ability to communicate meaningfully with one another—hence they are fundamental communicative competencies. There are certainly other reasons to study conversation, but for the present I hope these are sufficient to give a sense of how central studying conversation is to the enterprise of learning how we interact in orderly and meaningful ways with one another.

BASIC CONCEPTS

By way of introducing some of the basic concepts in CA research, we'll look at an extract from another telephone conversation between two middle-aged women: Emma has called Nancy (all names, by the way, have been changed), and this excerpt begins several minutes into the call.

- #2 [NB:II:2:9]
- 1 Emm: so[me a'° s]ome a'that stuff hits yuh pretty ha:rd=
- 2 Nan: [°Ye:ah°]
- 3 Emm: = 'n then: °yuh thin:k we:ll d'you wanna be°
- 4 (0.7)
- 5 Nan: hhhhhh[hh]
- 6 Emm: [↑PA:R:T of ut. w:Wuddiyuh ↑DOin.
- 7 (0.9)
- 8 Nan: What'm I do[in?
- 9 Emm: [Cleani:ng?=
 10 Nan: =hh.hh I'm ironing wouldju belie:ve ↑tha:t.
- 11 Emm: Oh: bless it[s ↓hea:rt.]
- 12 Nan: [In f a :c]t I: ire I start'd ironing en I: d-
 13 I: (.) Somehow er another ahrning js kind of lea:ve me:
 14 co:[ld]
- 15 Emm: [Ye]ah,
 16 (.)
- 17 Nan: [Yihknow,]
- 18 Emm: [Wanna c'm] do:wn 'av [a bah:ta] lu:nch w]ith me?=
 19 Nan: [°It's js] ()°]
- 20 Emm: =Ah gut s'm beer'n stu:ff,
 21 (0.3)
- 22 Nan: ↑Wul yer ril sweet hon: uh:m
 23 (.)
- 24 Emm: [Or d'y] ou'av] sup'n [else °()°
- 25 Nan: [L e t-] I :] hu. [n:No: I haf to: uh call Roul's mother,h
 26 I told'er I:d call'er this morning I [gotta letter] from'er en
 27 Emm: [°(Uh huh.)°]
- 28 Nan: .hhhhh A:nd uhm
 29 (1.0)
- 30 Nan: .tch u.-So: she in the letter she said if you ca:n why (.)
 31 yih know call me Saturday morning en I jst haven't. h
 32 [.hhh]
- 33 Emm: [°Mm h]m:°=
 34 Nan: = 'T's like takin a beating.
 35 (0.2)
- 36 Nan: kh[hh ↑hnh hnh]-hnh- [hnh
 37 Emm: [°M m : : ; °] [No one heard a wo:rd hah,
 38 Nan: >Not a word,<
 39 (0.2)
- 40 Nan: Hah ah,

41 (0.2)
 42 Nan: n:Not (.) not a word,h
 43 (.)
 44 Nan: Not et all, except Roul's mother gotta call .hhhhh (0.3)
 45 °I think it wuss:: (0.3) th'Mondee er the Tue:sday after
 46 Mother's Da:y,

This transcript may at first seem formidably difficult to follow. It was made by Gail Jefferson (who became one of Sacks' and Schegloff's collaborators) according to the conventions she developed. These are based on standard orthography (rather than phonetic systems) and attempt to capture the timing and placement of speech (e.g., overlaps and pauses/silences), sound qualities (such as sound stretching, emphasis, loudness, marked pitch changes, and certain intonational features), and a range of other features of the talk including in- and out-breaths, laughter, and cutoff words or sounds. The significance or relevance of these details may not be (probably is not) apparent when one is transcribing the recording of an interaction; they may come to have any significance only as one begins to analyze the data. But at the time the transcription is made, all that lies ahead; the transcriber attempts only to capture on the page, as faithfully as possible, in as much detail as possible what was actually said and how and when it was said.

I have selected a telephone call with which to illustrate some of the basic concepts and premises of CA's approach, rather than a face-to-face interaction, only because it simplifies matters. For the present we can focus on the essentials and don't have to deal with the complexities associated with aspects of nonverbal behavior such as eye gaze, posture, gesture, movement, and the impact of the ambient surroundings. It is important to emphasize, however, that when we are studying (video recordings of) face-to-face interaction, then of course nonverbal, bodily behavior—including facial expression, gaze, posture, gesture, and so forth—is involved in the sequential management and organization of interaction along the lines sketched later. In this respect, then, CA is as equally applicable to face-to-face (and multiparty) interactions as it is to those over the telephone. But in important respects nonverbal conduct is subordinate to the verbal conduct with which it is intermeshed; it's probably true to say that none of the practices, devices, or patterns identified in CA research are shaped or altered in any significant ways by accompanying nonverbal conduct (but for particularly compelling accounts of the interconnections between nonverbal behavior and the speech it accompanies, see, for example, Goodwin, 1981, 1995; Lerner, 2002; Wootton, 1997). However, the key point is that, although CA's methodology may be applied to interactions in certain kinds of experiments, interviews, or simulations and fictional constructs, basic research in CA uses only naturally occurring interactions as data.

This telephone conversation is, like any other, unique in its time and place, and having been held by these two participants, with whatever history and relationship they have with one another and in whatever circumstances the call was made. However, despite this uniqueness, there is much about the interaction that will strike you as familiar, as very like elements that are found in other unique conversations—and by familiar, I mean not particularly through professional linguistic and interactional investigation, but through what we may recognize as persons who are ordinary conversationalists. For example,

in line 25 and again in line 44 Nancy refers to someone as *Roul's mother*. From what we learn during the call, Roul is Nancy's ex-husband, the "ex" perhaps being a reason for not referring to his mother as *my mother-in-law*. But the reference *Roul's mother* conveys that although Emma will know who *Roul* refers to, she might not recognize whom Nancy was talking about if she referred to Roul's mother by her first name. In other words, the reference terms Nancy selects rather precisely indicate what Emma might be expected to know (and plainly does know)—the first name of her (Nancy's) ex-husband, but not her ex-husband's mother's first name. Referring to someone by first name only, on the understanding that the recipient is able and likely to know/recognize whom one is talking about, is quite familiar (see Sacks and Schegloff, 1979).

So also is the way in which Emma invites Nancy over (line 18 and on) after having inquired into what she's doing (line 6). Whether or not Emma inquired about what Nancy was doing with the intention of asking her over, and to check out first whether Nancy was otherwise occupied, the pattern of making an invitation after first inquiring whether the recipient would be free, available, or whatever, is one that we would all recognize. I'll return to this later.

A third illustration, very briefly: When Emma asks, "No one heard a wo:rd hah," (line 37), it's very evident that she is formulating something as complainable on Nancy's part. This isn't a neutral inquiry about whether Nancy has heard from her ex-husband: it's recognizing and making explicit something that might be adumbrated in *taking a beating* and something that Nancy might feel aggrieved about. The complainable character of not having heard is conveyed through the extreme formulations *no one* and *not a word* (rather than some lesser version like *So you haven't heard from him?* This way of conveying that someone's conduct is reprehensible and therefore complainable, through describing their behavior in extreme terms, is again quite familiar to us as conversationalists (and see Pomerantz, 1986, for an analysis of the "moral" work done through such extreme formulations).

These examples merely illustrate how, through all the uniqueness of this telephone call and the particular things these participants say to one another and the circumstances they talk about, one can see familiar patterns in the way they interact. CA is concerned with identifying and explicating those patterns, because therein lie the structures and practices that make coherent, mutually comprehensible communication and action possible in interaction.

There are four basic concepts that underpin CA's explorations of the patterns, structures, and practices that are to be found in conversation. These are:

- Turns at talk and turn taking
- Turn design
- Social action
- Sequence organization.

These can be considered as first order concepts from which a cumulative picture is beginning to emerge of the ways in which conversation is organized and of the communicative practices that lie behind those organizations. So it will be worth reviewing each of these in a little depth.

Turns at Talk and Turn Taking

The most basic form of organization for conversation is that participants take turns to speak. Whatever conversations may be about, whatever topics are covered, whoever and however many take part, whatever their similarities or differences may be, in whatever circumstances, it is fundamental to conversation that one speaker takes a turn and is followed by another speaker. Of course there is tremendous variation in the length of turns (turn size), in the order in which participants take turns, and in what they say. The power of the model that Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) proposed for the organization of turn taking is that it accommodates all such variations as well as the contextual differences between individual unique conversations. We can see how each speaker takes a turn to talk, and something of the variation in the size of their turns, by reviewing just a fragment from #2.

- #3 [NB:II:2:9]
 3 Emm: =’n then: °yuh thi:nk we:ll d’you wanna be°
 4 (0.7)
 5 Nan: hhhhhh[hh
 6 Emm: [↑PA:R:T of ut. w:Wuddiyuh ↑DOin.
 7 (0.9)
 8 Nan: What’m I do[in?
 9 Emm: [Cleani:ng?=
 10 Nan: =hh.hh I’m ironing wouldju belie:ve ↑tha:t.
 11 Emm: Oh: bless it[s ↓hea:rt.]
 12 Nan: [In f a :c]t I: ire I start’d ironing en I: d-
 13 I: (.) Somehow er another ahrning js kind of lea:ve me:
 14 co:ld

The turns each speaker takes consist of identifiable components or units. For instance, Emma’s turn in line 9 consists of a single word, Nancy’s in line 8 a single brief sentence, whilst Emma’s in lines 3/6 consists of two sentential units—*and then you think well do you want to be part of it*, to which she adds *What are you doing?* Similarly Nancy’s turns in line 8 and again in lines 10/12 consist of multiple units, as in [I’m ironing]+[would you believe that]. Speakers construct their turns at talk out of units, including single words, single clauses or phrases, single sentences, or any combination of these. These grammatical units are the building blocks out of which turns at talk are constructed so that turns may be constructed out of one unit or multiple functionally differentiated units. This intersection between grammar and interaction, and the role grammar plays as a practice for constructing turns—in which lexis, clauses, and sentences are turn construction units (TCUs)—has very fundamental significance for linguistic analysis. As Schegloff argues, traditionally in linguistics “the logical structure and identity of the proposition (is) the fundamental constitutive grounding for language. It is this propositional, predicative core which makes the sentence or clause—with its ‘arguments’—central” (Schegloff, 1996, p. 111). However, viewed in the context in which words, clauses, and sentences are used in interaction, they are to be regarded not in terms of their propositional content, but rather in terms of what they are put together to do in the interaction, and their adequacy (and completeness) for doing that work.

Viewed in these terms, the size of a turn and how many units it is constructed from depend on the interplay between what a turn is designed to do, the way in which a turn may be designed to select a next speaker (as Emma's inquiry in line 6 selects Nancy as next speaker), when other(s) choose to speak, and the ways in which current speakers may add incrementally to their turn (most obviously by using conjunctionals, as Emma does in line 3 to continue from her prior turn and Nancy does in line 12). Emma's addition of a further TCU in line 6 is rather more dramatic. Before this point they have been talking about a class in which Nancy is studying and the reaction by her much younger student colleagues to the issues of the day (especially drugs). When Emma says "some a'that stuff hits yuh pretty ha:rd= 'n then: °yuh thin:k we:ll d'you wanna be° (0.7) ↑PA:R:T of ut.," she's fairly evidently winding up that prior topic. By straightaway adding her inquiry "w:Wuddiyuh ↑DOin.," she changes the topic in the direction of the invitation that she possibly has in mind.

How a turn is designed to incorporate more than one unit, how speakers manage the construction of multiple unit turns, how they add incrementally to a turn that might otherwise be considered to have been complete, and how recipients recognize that the speaker may have completed (or be completing) a turn are all matters currently under investigation (though see Auer, 1996; Ford & Thompson, 1996; Schegloff, 1996b).⁷

The matter of when a turn might be complete is not one that is of interest only in the arcane world of the analyst; this is a real issue for participants in interaction, at every moment during their own turns and the turns of their coparticipants, because they need to know when to speak and what it would be relevant to do and say next. One particularly clear example of the practical exigencies faced by speakers taking turns that will consist of several TCUs is provided by the task facing anyone who is embarking on telling a story. Stories take a number of TCUs to complete, often very many, so that someone about to tell a story needs to ensure that others, recipients, do not begin speaking until the story has been completed. To manage this, they often introduce the story with a preface, such as "something very very: cute happened las' night et the Warehouse." (the following #4, lines 1/2), indicating that the narrative will last through however many units it takes for a story about something cute happening to be complete. In effect, this instructs the recipient to hold off until that point, which is to say that the prefatory work in setting up the story works to suspend the transition to a next speaker (i.e., in #4, to Geri) until the story is complete.

#4 [F:TC:1:1]

- | | | |
|---|------|---|
| 1 | Shi: | .hhh Listen, u- <u>something very</u> <u>very</u> : <u>cute</u> happened las' night |
| 2 | | et the <u>Warehouse</u> . |
| 3 | | (.) |
| 4 | Ger: | Wha[t |
| 5 | Shi: | [.hhhhh Yih <u>KNOW</u> Cathy, (.) Larry Taylor's ex girlfrie[nd,] |
| 6 | Ger: | [Yee]ah. |

⁷ Auer (1996) shows how intonation contours associated with expansions beyond possible (syntactic) turn completion points are systematically associated with the projection of turn completion (and transition). Ford and Thompson (1996), particularly, explore the relationship between grammar, intonation, and pragmatics in the construction of turns and participants' recognition of the point at which an ongoing turn is, or is likely to be, complete.

- 7 Shi: [.hhhhhhhh]=
 8 Ger: [°°M-hm?°°]=
 9 Shi: =Okay. Cathy came in las'night. ((sniff))
 10 (0.4)
 11 Shi: .t
 12 (0.6)
 13 Shi: .p Whenever she comes in she always wants me t'do something
 14 fer her,
 15 Ger: M-hm,
 16 Shi: either siddown'n ta:lk,h whatever. .hhhhh Suh she came in
 17 en she starts asking me if I'd seen ↑Gary. Gary Klei:n,
 18 .hhhh I s'd yeh eez here t'night .hh she sz well wouldju
 19 go find im please'n tell im t'give me my ten dollars thet
 20 'e owes me,
 21 (:): .tch
 22 Ger: mWhaddiyu haftih get [in on that fo[r,
 23 Shi: [.hhhh [Wai:t. I started
 24 lau:ghing I looked et 'er en I said believe it er not
 25 little gi::rl .hh this's my jo:b. I s'd go do it cherself
 26 it's yer money...

After the point at which the narrative is underway, in line 9, the recipient, Geri, does not take a turn (except for the brief acknowledgement and continuer in line 15) until line 22. Here it appears that she has, incorrectly as it happens, understood Cathy's request "well wouldju go find im please'n tell im t'give me my ten dollars thet 'e owes me," as being the *something cute* announced in the preface as the story's point (*cute* here seems to be used, and understood, in its negative sense, close to impertinent). But as it turns out from Shirley's continuation of her story after this (data not shown), the sheer impertinence of Cathy's request reported in lines 17–20 is not (or was not intended to be) the *something cute* that Shirley flagged in the preface to her story. This is merely a step along the way, a foretaste of more to come about Cathy's egregious behavior, which is subsequently revealed to have involved underage drinking. So Shirley was only partially successful in establishing the turn space in which to tell her story: Geri's premature response to the story results in Shirley having to do a form of repair, "Wai:t" (line 23), in order to continue her story. Stories and narratives are therefore the kinds of turns that pre-eminently require multiple construction units to complete; the task that tellers confront, then, is to indicate to recipients that this story will take a number of units to tell, and that they should not begin speaking until the point at which the story is complete (on this and other aspects of storytelling in conversation, see C. Goodwin, 1984; M. H. Goodwin, 1982; Jefferson, 1978; Lerner, 1992; Mandelbaum, 1987; and Sacks, 1986). The suspension of transition relevance, which otherwise operates at the end of (each) TCU, is therefore of immense practical interactional importance for anyone who is going to take a turn that will consist of multiple construction units.

Turn Design

When a speaker takes a turn at talk, he or she designs that turn, in the sense of selecting what will go in that turn, in two quite distinct respects. First, a speaker selects what action

the turn will be designed to perform. Second, he or she selects the details of the verbal constructions through which that action is to be accomplished.

As a way to consider the first aspect of turn design, the selection of the action to be performed in a turn, it is worth comparing the two answers Nancy gives to Emma's inquiry about what she's doing.

- #5 [NB:II:2:9]
 6 Emm: ... w:Wuddiyuh ↑DOin.
 7 (0.9)
 8 Nan: What'm I do[in?
 9 Emm: [Cleani:ng?=
 10 Nan: =hh.hh I'm ironing wouldju belie:ve ↑tha:t.
 11 Emm: Oh: bless it[s ↓hea:rt.]
 12 Nan: [In f_a:c]t I: ire I start'd ironing en I: d-
 13 I: (.) Somehow er another ahrning js kind of lea:ve me:
 14 co:[ld]
 15 Emm: [Ye]ah,
 16 (.)
 17 Nan: [Yihknow,]
 18 Emm: [Wanna c'm] do:wn 'av a bah:ta lu:nch with me?=

Nancy initially reports that she's ironing (line 10), her use of the present progressive tense indicating that this is an ongoing chore. However, when she continues in lines 12–14, she gives rather a different impression: her second version, “I started ironing,” suggests at least the possibility that she may have left off ironing, and the rest of her turn indicates that this is something she'd rather not be doing. Emma's response to the first version (“Oh: bless its ↓hea:rt,” line 11) is some kind of admiring sympathy, at any rate a sympathetic acknowledgment of Nancy's report. Her response to the second version is quite different; it's here in line 18 that she makes her invitation. In some respects, Emma's turn in line 11 was an opportunity for her to have invited Nancy over for lunch: It was at least a position in which she might have made her invitation. But it was perhaps not an auspicious environment in which to do so, insofar as she might have treated Nancy's report in line 10 as indicating that she was occupied, busy with her chore. It's pretty clear, therefore, that Emma passes over that first opportunity, and instead makes her invitation in response to Nancy's subsequent and more encouraging report in lines 12–14. We see Emma, then, selecting which action to do in which turn or position.

Another example illustrates how speakers select which action to perform in a given turn. We have seen that in response to Nancy's explanation that she has to call Roul's mother, and particularly with respect to the trouble to which Nancy alludes, Emma formulates a complainable understanding of that trouble.

- #6 [NB:II:2:9]
 22 Nan: ↑Wul yer ril sweet hon: uh:m
 23 (.)
 24 Emm: [Or d'y] ou 'av] sup'n [else °()°
 25 Nan: [L e t-] I :] hu. [n:No: i haf to: uh call Roul's mother, h
 26 I told'er I:'d call'er this morning I [gotta letter] from'er en
 27 Emm: [°(Uh huh.)°]

- 28 Nan: .hhhhh_h A:nd uhm
 29 (1.0)
 30 Nan: .tch u.-So: she in the letter she said if you ca:n why (.)
 31 yihknow call me Saturday morning en I jst haven't. h
 32 [.hhhh]
 33 Emm: [°Mm h]m:°=
 34 Nan: ='T's like takin a beating.
 35 (0.2)
 36 Nan: kh[hh ↑hnhh hnh]-hnh- [hnh
 37 Emm: [°M m : : ;, °] [No one heard a wo:rd hah,

In line 37, Emma chooses between two kinds of trouble on which to comment: her turn here addresses the trouble Nancy is having with respect to her ex-husband and thereby takes them in that topical direction, talking about Nancy's ex-husband's behavior (see lines 38–46 in #2). In doing so, Emma chooses not to deal with the (troublesome) import of Nancy's account for the invitation to come down for lunch. This contrasts with the following fragment from the very beginning of another call, in which a friend has called Emma.

- #7 [NB:IV:9]
 1 Mar: ... lo:, °hhuh°
 2 Emm: How'r you:.=
 3 Mar: =Well wuhdiyuh doin. hh hnh
 4 (0.5)
 5 Emm: .hhh(hhOh:) Margy?=
 6 Mar: =eeYeehuh.[a-
 7 Emm: [Oh: I'm jis sittin here with Bill'n Gladys'n
 8 haa:eh fixin'm a drink they're goin out tih ↑dinner:.
 9 (.)
 10 Emm: H[e's-
 11 Mar: + [Oh::: Oh.
 12 Emm: Why: whiddiyih want.
 13 (1.0)
 14 Mar: hhuhh Well?h I wunnid um come down en I wannidju tuh call
 15 some numbers back to me <b't it's not import'n

Evidently Mary's opening inquiry about what Emma is doing (line 3) is made in the service of wanting to ask Emma to help her with something (a bookkeeping chore, calling some numbers back to her). At lines 7/8, Mary might have done some kind of acknowledgment or appreciation in response to Emma's account of what she was doing, along the lines of *How nice, how are Bill and Gladys?* or some such pleasantry, much as Emma did in response to Nancy's report of her ironing, when Emma's response in #2 line 11 was admiring sympathy. Instead, through her stretched, downward intoned and repeated *Oh* in line 11, Mary expresses disappointment, thereby treating Emma's report in terms of the difficulty it raises for what she intended to ask (which as a consequence is transparent to Emma: See line 12).

Exactly this, perhaps—expressing disappointment—was an option for Emma in example #6, in response to Nancy's explanation of having to call Rob's mother. She might in that position, in line 37, have said something like *Oh well, never mind, we'll do it another time*, or *Well, can you call her now and come over when you're through?* In other words, she might have treated Nancy's explanation in terms of its consequence for the lunch invitation. By opting instead to take up the matter of Nancy's ex-husband's behavior, she leaves aside for the present what the upshot of that explanation might be for the invitation (and of course there can be a strategic advantage to doing so: The way that it's left here, Nancy has not officially rejected the invitation, and no decision has been reached, so that it can be, and is in fact, returned to later). So in summary, Emma selects the action of sympathizing with Nancy over her difficulties, alluded to in Nancy's explanation, which moves the topic of conversation in that direction (for more on recipients' responses to troubles telling, see Jefferson, 1984, 1988); in doing so, she avoids explicitly formulating or addressing the consequences of Nancy's explanation for the lunch invitation (i.e., she avoids the kind of action that Mary takes in #7 line 11).

These examples, then, illustrate how speakers design their turns, in terms of selecting one from among a number of possible actions or activities to perform in that turn/slot. Speakers also design their turns through the details of how they perform an action, by selecting between alternative ways of saying something or performing some action. Consider again Emma's invitation to Nancy.

- #8 [NB:II:2:9]
 18 Emm: Wanna c'm do:wn 'av [a bah:ta] lu:nch w'jith me?=
 19 Nan: [°It's js] ()°]
 20 Emm: =Ah gut s'm beer'n stu:ff,

We happen to know (because they refer to the time just a little later in the call) that it is a quarter past eleven, so Emma has called only a little before lunchtime. Moreover, this is well into the telephone call; Emma has not, for instance, made her invitation the first topic of the call, or in any other way indicated that this is her reason for calling Nancy. Indeed, she's made the invitation only on finding that Nancy may welcome some diversion (lines 12/14 of #2). In these respects, this is not a formal invitation: Calling just an hour or so before the lunch in question, rather than a day or a week before, and inviting Nancy only when it's clear she might like a break, gives it a spontaneous character.

The casualness achieved in the timing of the invitation is reflected in the way the invitation itself is designed. The design of a turn refers to the words used to construct a turn, as well as other syntactic and grammatical features, phonetic and prosodic aspects, and (in face-to-face interaction) gaze, posture, bodily orientation, and the like. These are selected from among a range of alternative possible elements or components. For instance, each of the elements in her invitation in lines 18/20 conveys something casual, an informal occasion. "Wanna" is markedly casual, in comparison with *Would you like to...* Inviting her, not to come for lunch, but to *come down*, suggests the closeness of their homes and therefore ease of coming. *A bite of lunch*, perhaps even more clearly than other components, suggests something for which no particular preparations have been made, nothing fancy has been fixed. And that is enhanced by the inducement *I got*

some beer and stuff, further indicating something thrown together, nothing special, only whatever Emma happens to have in the house. Each of these elements is selected to convey the impromptu character of the invitation (compare this with *Would you like to come for lunch next Friday . . .*). It's quite different from the way an invitation would be designed if it were made some time in advance, for a particular occasion, at which others might be present. In this respect, notice that turn design locks into the organization of social affairs outside the talk, as it were; if Nancy goes over, she would presumably be surprised to find others there at Emma's for lunch (note Emma's *with me*, end of line 18).

Turn design lies, therefore, at the heart of what it is to take a turn in conversation. It captures how speakers select what to do in a turn, what action to take in a given position; we have seen in these examples how speakers have options in that regard. It captures also the specific linguistic or verbal implementation of the selected action, so that Emma conveys a particular kind of invitation, or more properly depicts a particular kind of occasion, through selecting terms that make it a casual, informal invitation. We'll further explore the interconnections between turn design and action in the next section.

Social Action

I gave as one of the reasons for studying conversation that it is a primary site, perhaps the primary site, for social action. When people converse, they are not merely talking, not merely describing (their day, what happened, or whatever), not filling time, or any of the other characterizations of conversation as a form of language idling. They do things in their turns at talk: They are constructing their turns to perform an action or to be part of the management of some activity (again, I make the distinction in order to encompass turns such as Emma's inquiry in line 6 of #2, which may be part of, or made in the service of, the activity of managing her subsequent invitation; this concept will be developed later). Most obviously, we have seen Emma performing such actions as inviting Nancy in her turn in lines 18/20. Or in her sympathetic acknowledgement of Nancy's account, "No one heard a wo:rd hah," formulating a complaint on Nancy's behalf about her ex-husband's conduct. So we are studying the use of language in conversation (turn design) employed to do things in the social world, and we focus on the social responsiveness of the sequential organization of these activities being conducted in conversation.

But it is important to add that CA investigates social action in a particular way that is distinctive from other approaches to speech acts (see Cooren's chapter, this volume). CA focuses specifically on participants' understandings of one another's conduct. Schegloff recommended some conditions for an appropriately "empirically grounded account of action," one of which is that it should demonstrate that the action in question was understood and experienced as such by the participants (Schegloff, 1996c, p. 172). It is a premise of CA that when speakers take/construct a turn at talk, they are somehow fitting it to what came before, to what the other speaker just said. In doing so, they are analyzing the prior speaker's conduct, and the result of their analysis can be found in the construction of their fitted, responsive turn. Central to CA's investigations and findings is the focus on how a speaker comes to an understanding about the prior speaker's conduct. In other words, CA focuses not only on how one participant understood the other's prior

turn/conduct, but also on what basis they arrived at that understanding. This is another of Schegloff's three conditions, which he summarizes in this way: "It is not enough to show that some utterance was understood by its recipient to implement a particular action. . . . In order to provide analytically the grounds for the possibility of such an understanding, an account must be offered of what about the production of that talk/conduct provided for its recognizability as such an action: that is, what were the methodical, or procedural, or 'practice-d' grounds for its production" (Schegloff, 1996c, p. 173).

This key issue, how speakers come to understand the other's conduct, in a very direct way connects turn design with the accomplishment of social action. It will be worth explicating this connection by looking more closely at the interaction between Nancy and Emma, immediately after Emma's invitation.

- #9 [NB:II:2:9]
 18 Emm: Wanna c'm do:wn 'av [a bah:ta] [u:nch w]ith me?=
 19 Nan: [°It's js] ()°
 20 Emm: =Ah gut s'm beer'n stu:ff,
 21 (0.3)
 22 Nan: ↑Wul yer ril sweet hon: uh:m
 23 (.)
 24 Emm: [Or d'y] ou 'av] sup'n else °()°
 25 Nan: [L e t-] I :] hu.

Having invited Nancy down for lunch, Emma is of course listening for whether Nancy will accept her invitation. It is pretty clear in the turn in line 24, which she begins simultaneously with Nancy, that Emma anticipates that Nancy might have some difficulty in coming, and therefore that she might be going to decline the invitation. When she asks *Or do you have something else*, she is offering on Nancy's behalf the kind of standard account for declining an invitation, a prior engagement or commitment, here formulated in the most general terms (i.e., *something else*). To repeat: We're focusing not just on social actions, but on participants' understandings of those actions, and particularly the basis on which such understandings were arrived at. So here, we might consider not only that Emma anticipates an upcoming declination as an understanding of Nancy's prior turn (in line 22), but also the basis for that understanding.

There are three aspects of Nancy's response that indicate she might decline. One is that it is delayed: after the completion of Emma's invitation, Nancy delays for 0.3 seconds (line 21) before replying. We shall return to this later, but for the present we can note that delays such as this can presage trouble, a difficulty of some kind (such as the recipient's reservations, disagreement etc.; see, e.g., Pomerantz, 1984; Schegloff, 1988). Second, after this delay, Nancy does an appreciation of Emma's invitation, "Wul yer ril sweet hon: uh:m" (line 22). Nancy could, of course, simply have accepted the invitation, as in *I'd love to*, or perhaps accept with an appreciation, along the lines of *That's awfully sweet of you, I'd love to*. Thus, Nancy does not do an outright acceptance at the first place she could have following the invitation. The third important aspect of Nancy's response is that there is a difference between the putative example of an appreciation accompanying an acceptance and the appreciation that Nancy actually does here. The difference is that

the latter is prefaced by *Well* in the initial place in the turn. This association between a *well*-prefaced appreciation and declination is illustrated in this example.

#10 [SBL:1:1:10:14]

- 1 Ros: And uh the: if you'd care tuh come ovuh, en visit u
 2 little while this morning I'll give you [cup a'coffee.
 3 Bea: [khhh
 4 Bea: + Uhhh-huh hh W'l that's awf'lly sweet of yuh I don't
 5 think I c'n make it this morning, hheeuuh uh:m (0.3)
 6 'tch I'm running en a:d in the paper 'nd an:d uh hh I
 7 haftih stay near the pho::ne,

Bea's declination of Rose's invitation to come over for coffee that morning consists of a number of components (to be discussed shortly), but her explicit rejection ("I don't think I c'n make it this morning,") also begins with a *well*-prefaced appreciation. So it seems that Emma's understanding that Nancy might have difficulty accepting her invitation and might be going to decline it, even before any difficulty has been articulated or made explicit, is based on the delay in Nancy's response, on her not straightaway accepting, and on the particular design of her appreciation—that it, is *well*-prefaced.

For the purposes of illustration, I have focused here on actions for which there are readily available and widely used vernacular labels, according to which we (both analysts and participants) can easily recognize that someone is inviting, rejecting, agreeing, offering, requesting, complaining, and the like. However, participants' conduct in conversation encompasses a wide range of actions or activities that are not so easily recognizable and not so easily labeled in the vernacular world of ordinary interaction. Take, for instance, the method (action) of accomplishing the transition from one topic to another as illustrated in the first example I discussed, or the changing of topic managed through a more stepwise progression (Jefferson, 1984). Or consider the different work (actions) done with the token *Mm* such as acknowledging, acting as a continuer, or assessing, each associated with different intonation contours (respectively, falling, fall-rise, and rise-fall; Gardner, 1997). Similarly, Heritage shows that the token *Oh* performs different actions according to its sequential position and whether or not it is freestanding (Heritage, 1984b, 1998, 2002). The actions that Jefferson identified as "glossing" by a speaker and the "unpacking of a gloss" by a recipient cannot easily be translated into vernacular terms for or descriptions of actions (Jefferson, 1986). Research has identified actions consisting of, or managed through, "telling my side" as a "fishing" device (Pomerantz, 1980), "pre" inquiries (Schegloff, 1980), seeking the other's perspective ("perspective display"; Maynard, 1989), reported speech (Holt, 1996), and the use of *actually* in turn-initial and turn-final positions (Clift, 2001). Perhaps the clearest example of the explication of "a previously undescribed action," an action for which there is no obvious vernacular label (together with a particularly clear statement of the requirements of an empirically grounded account of action), is provided by Schegloff's account of the action—"confirming allusions"—which is performed through a certain kind of repeat (Schegloff, 1996c).

To emphasize: CA investigates the analyses participants make of one another's talk, specifically the actions performed or managed in that talk. But also, and quite centrally, CA

research is focused on how those analyses or understandings were arrived at, the practices through which the prior turn(s) could have been designed as being, and recognized as being, that kind of action.

Sequence Organization

The final building block to be reviewed concerns the shape or pattern, or organization, which some successions of turns have. Thus far, we have focused pretty much on individual turns—taking turns, designing turns, and the like. But it is quite apparent that turns are connected with one another in systematically organized patterns or sequences of turns, as was illustrated very briefly in the sequential pattern in #1 associated with figurative expressions and topic transition.

The most basic sequence organization is one that will be familiar to anyone with any acquaintance with CA research. Adjacency pairs are pairs of actions in which if one speaker does an initial action of a certain type, the other (i.e., recipient) is expected to respond with an action paired with that first action. If a first speaker's action is to ask a question, the recipient's action in turn should be to answer; if the first speaker greets the other, the recipient should return the greeting; if the first speaker invites the other, then the recipient should either accept or decline the invitation (Sacks' last recorded lectures give an authoritative account of adjacency pairs: Sacks, 1992, pp. 521–575). The expectation that the recipient should respond with an appropriate action—the conditional relevance of a second pair part, on the production of a first pair part—is a constraint of sorts, insofar as, if the recipient does not construct a next turn as an appropriate response, this absence is noticeable. Hence the sense of the accountable character of the 0.3-second pause before Nancy's response to Emma's invitation in our core example: After an invitation, a response by Nancy is expected, but is not immediately forthcoming (see also Davidson, 1984).

Another example may help to illustrate the interactional significance of the discriminative power of adjacency pairs (Sacks, 1992, p. 521), that is, the expectation that a response will be fitted to the initial action by being a second pair part from the same pair as the initial action. This is from a call that Emma has made, in part to thank her friend Mary for a luncheon party she gave about a week ago. The fragment begins at the point where Emma is apologizing for the delay in calling to thank her.

- #11 [NB:VII:3]
- 1 Emm: I shoulda ca:lled you sooner b't I don't know where the
2 week we::n[t,
3 Mar: [u-We:ll:: Oh- yEdna you don'haftuh call
4 me up=
5 Emm: =[I wa::nt [t o : .]
6 Mar: [I wz jus [tickled] thetche-
7 (.)
8 Mar: nYihkno:w w'n you came u:p en uh-.hhh
9 W'l haftuh do tha[t more] o[:ften.]
10 Emm: [.hhhhh] [Wul w]hy don't we: uh-m:
11 Why don't I take you'n Mo:m up there tuh: Coco's. someday

- 8 Nan: What'm I do[in]
 9 Emm: [Cleani:ng?=
 10 Nan: =hh.hh I'm ironing wouldju belie:ve ↑tha:t.
 11 Emm: Oh: bless it[s ↓hea:rt.]
 12 Nan: [In f a :c]t I: ire I start'd ironing en I: d-
 13 I: (.) Somehow er another ahrning js kind of lea:ve me:
 14 co: [ld]
 15 Emm: [Ye]ah,
 16 (.)
 17 Nan: [Yihknow,]
 18 Emm: [Wanna c'm] do:wn 'av a bah:ta lu:nch wjith me?=
 19

We have seen that Emma makes her invitation in a slot that seems like an auspicious environment, in response to a report, the design of which suggests that Nancy might rather not be doing the chore and may be willing to give it up or may even have done so (lines 12/14). Emma did not make her invitation at the first opportunity, in line 11, a slot that was not auspicious because in Nancy's prior turn (line 10), the chore is described in terms that depict her as currently busy doing it. These reports, and the auspicious environment they eventually generate, have been elicited by Emma's inquiry *What are you doing?* (line 6). Even if Emma had telephoned Nancy with the express intention of asking her over for lunch, the invitation has been set up by her inquiry. Indeed, the inquiry may have been designed specifically for that purpose, to check out whether Nancy might be free. Such inquiries, asked to ascertain whether, if an invitation was forthcoming, it's likely that it would be accepted, function as *preinvitations*; they play a role that is both sequential, and associated with social action and social solidarity—that of trying to ensure the success of the invitation in being accepted.

Such presequence inquiries, in this case a preinvitation, are first moves in a quite clearly discernible sequence shape, or organization. However, the shape will depend on whether the response to the inquiry encourages the action that the inquiry presages (here, invitation), indicating the first speaker (the inquirer) should go ahead, thereby providing the kind of auspicious environment we've seen previously. The following is another instance of such an inquiry, in which the response seems to encourage the invitation that follows.

#13 [JGII(b):8:14]

- 1 John: So who'r the boyfriends for the week.
 2 (0.2)
 3 Mary: .k.hhhhh- Oh: go::d e-yih this one'n that one yihknow,
 4 I jist, yih know keep busy en go out when I wanna go out
 5 John it's nothing .hhh I don't have anybody serious
 6 on the string,
 7 John: So in other words you'd go out if I:: askedche out
 8 one a' these times.
 9 Mary: Yeah! Why not.

The sequence here consists of four turns or slots, (i) the preinvitation inquiry, (ii) an encouraging response,⁸ (iii) invitation, and (iv) acceptance. This is perhaps the canonical sequence associated with preinvitations. In the example of Emma's lunch invitation, the final move in the sequence is intercepted by Emma's anticipation of "trouble" and therefore not completed—which may have been exactly what Emma's interception was designed to achieve. And, of course, the trouble that arose happened to be unexpectedly unconnected with the chore that Nancy reports in her stage ii response(s) to Emma's presequence inquiry.

If the response to the inquiry (stage ii) is discouraging, that is, if it indicates circumstances that would prevent an invitation being accepted, then the sequence is simultaneously attenuated, in so far as stage iii (the invitation) may not be forthcoming. It is also protracted, because discouraging responses typically are accompanied by the recipient asking what it is that the first speaker was leading up to with the presequence inquiry. This may be done either in the same turn as the initial (stage ii) response (as in A: *What are you doing?* B: *Well we're just going out, why?*), or in a subsequent turn, as happened in #7 (repeated here).

- #7 [NB:IV:9]
 1 Mar: ...lɔ:, °hhuh°
 2 Emm: How'r you:.=
 3 Mar: =Well wuhdiyuh doin. hh hnh
 4 (0.5)
 5 Emm: .hhh (hhOh:) Margy?=-

⁸Sometimes it is clear in his or her response that the recipient recognizes what the inquiry is leading to and responds in a way that is designed to indicate that the first speaker should go ahead and ask, invite, request, and so on, or not. In this example (#13), it is not necessarily so clear that the recipient, Mary, does recognize what John's inquiry is prefacing—or that her reply is designed to encourage him in that way. By "encourage," all that is meant is that in the reply, the first speaker will be able to find that in terms of the contingencies that may be relevant to the acceptance of an invitation, the granting of a request, and so on, circumstances are such that the recipient might be free to accept an invitation, might be able to fulfil a request, and so on. So, for instance, in the following example, the answer to the prerequisite inquiry does not seem specially designed to encourage Gordon to go ahead and make a request: But the circumstances reported in Ken's reply indicate that one of the contingencies on which granting the request hangs, which is that ken should be going to the event to which Gordon wants a ride, is fulfilled.

- [Holt:88U:1:3:2]
 Gor: Good morning,
 (0.4)
 (Ken): .hhh
 Gor: hUh:m (0.2) .p.hhhh hu-You going to- (0.3) the music-
 (0.3) work_shop.
 Ken: + Yes[: I am:
 Gor: [.hhhhhh .g this .morning. I u-What time'r you going,
 (.)
 Ken: Well[ih_just about to leave to (pick Rebecca ↓up.)
 Gor: [.tlk
 (0.6)
 Gor: .tlkUh:m .p.hhh D'you think you c'd pick me up.h

- 6 Mar: =eeYeehuh.[a-
 7 Emm: [Oh: I'm jis sittin here with Bill'n Gladys'n
 8 haa:eh fixin'm a drink they're goin out tih ↑dinner:.
 9 (.)
 10 Emm: H[e's-
 11 Mar: + [Oh::: Oh.
 12 Emm: Why: whiddiyih want.
 13 (1.0)
 14 Mar: hhuhh Well?h I wunnid um come down en I wannidju tuh call
 15 some numbers back to me <b't it's not import'n

Emma's response in lines 7/8 to Mary's presequence inquiry (line 3) is treated by Mary as discouraging the request she wanted to make, as is evident to Emma in Mary's manifest disappointment in the stage iii slot, line 11. Emma's inquiry in line 12 about why Mary was asking in a sense reinstates the request Mary was going to make (and indeed successfully, because just after this Emma agrees to come over in a short while to help call numbers back for Mary).

It's worth highlighting that the sequence organization initiated through a presequence inquiry is so conventionalized that it amounts to being a practice to which participants themselves orient in understanding one another's conduct. In other words, such inquiries as *What are you doing?* are understood by recipients as a preliminary to an invitation, request, and so on. This is illustrated in the following example.

- #14 [Holt:2:14]
 1 Jim: J. P. Blenkinsop good morning,
 2 (.)
 3 Skip: Good morning Jim,
 4 (0.5)
 5 Skip: Uh it's Skip.
 6 Jim: ↑Hiyuh,
 7 Skip: You coming past the door,
 8 Jim: Certainly?
 9 (0.8)
 10 Jim: What time wouldju like the ↓car Sah.↓ =
 11 Skip: =Uh well ehhh hhehh hhhehh hhehh .hh Oh tbat's most
 12 unexpected of you hhh:: n(h)o it's v(h)ery nice'v you to
 13 offer huhh uh-↑heh heh-u-hu-.ehhh Thanks very much.

Skip's inquiry in line 7 about whether Jim is coming past the door is readily understood by Jim as a preliminary to a request. This is evident particularly in the elision of the request to come that is effected by Jim's offer in line 10. This represents a third sequential pattern associated with presequence inquiries, in which the action that was projected in stage iii, in this case a request, is omitted. In his stage ii response, the recipient has jumped forward to stage iv, that is, to granting the request, by making an offer. Note that the jokiness of Jim's offer (made as if he were a hired chauffeur), reciprocated in Skip's exaggerated surprise and his laughter in lines 11/13, is evidence for the conventionalized

and recognizable character of such presequence inquiries. At any rate, the bypassing of the projected request by the recipient making an offer, as in #14, most successfully manages the task for which the presequence inquiry was designed, to find out whether if a request were made, it is likely to be granted. Jim's offer both recognizes what the inquiry was leading to (again note the role of participants' understandings of one another's conduct) and grants the request without that needing to be made.

These presequence inquiries therefore initiate action sequences that become shaped according to the recipients' responses to those inquiries, and whether those responses encourage or discourage the actions the inquiries preface. The shapes or patterns associated with presequences, such as Emma's inquiry in #4 line 6 (*what are you doing?*), are an example of the kind of sequence organizations that CA research attempts to uncover.

These, then, are some of the principal building blocks of CA research. There is, however one further concept that must be put in place, to see how turn design, action, and sequence work together in the production of meaningful, coherent turns in conversation—that is, the mechanism for repairing problems or hitches as they arise.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ACTION AND REPAIR

It is fundamental to conversation that participants construct or design their talk so as to be understood in the way they wish to be understood. Turns are designed to be recognizable by others as doing what they mean to be doing—to be recognizable as being engaged in some particular form of activity and of doing some particular action within that form. In order to interact with others properly, adequately, or in a coherent fashion, we are required to construct (verbal) behavior so that it is recognizable by others for what we mean it to be. This is what is meant by the *accountability* of conduct, which rests on the intersubjectivity of talk-in-interaction, or the symmetry that Heritage summarizes thus, "... that both the production of conduct and its interpretation are the accountable products of a common set of methods or procedures" (Heritage, 1984a, p. 241). The aim of CA research is to identify precisely those methods, procedures, or practices that enable participants to construct their talk to do, and to be recognized as doing, what they mean to be doing. That is, we are investigating the evident patterns of talk and sequence, to uncover the practices that underlie the accountability of conduct. Thus CA research focuses on how participants, in interaction with one another, display and document for one another what is taking place, the character of what is happening/has happened, the type of sequence they are engaged in, the kind of action they are performing, and so on. By asking how they do these things, we mean to focus analysis on the practices, resources, or procedures through which people produce and understand conduct in common with one another.

Looking back at an example cited earlier, we see a rather transparent illustration of what it can take to design a turn at talk to be understood as a particular kind of action.

#15 [NB:VII:3]

1 Mar: I wz jus tickled thetche-

2 (.)

3 Mar: nYihkno:w w'n you came u:p en uh-.hhh=

- 4 =W'l haftuh do tha[t more] o[:ften.]
 5 Emm: [.hhhhh] [Wul w]hy don't we: uh-m:=
 6 =Why don't I take you'n Mo:m up there tuh: Coco's.someday
 7 fer lu:nch . . .

I noted earlier that Emma began constructing her turn in lines 5/6 as though *suggesting* a lunchtime get-together, reciprocating Mary's suggestion in line 4 that *We'll have to do that more often*. The sense of reciprocating here is particularly strong, because Mary's suggestion is so plainly matched or reflected in Emma's *Well why don't we*. By replacing *Well why don't we* with *Why don't I*, substituting the pronoun *I* for *we*, Emma changes the (projected) action into an invitation. Her self-repair thereby enables her to construct the turn accountably as an invitation. We have seen that this does not determine what action the recipient will in fact treat her turn as having performed: Mary appears to disregard the invitation import of this self-repair (in the wrangle they get into about whether it's Emma's treat; see #11 lines 13-19). The way Emma repairs the construction of her turn seems designed to substitute one action for another. Just parenthetically, it may be noted that the abandonment of one action and the substitution with another is partly managed here through speech perturbation (see Schegloff, 1979, and Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977, for more on the accompanying features of self-repairs) and restarting her turn (though with the deletion of the turn initial component *Well*, which is characteristic of repeats after repair initiators).

In a great variety of ways, self-repair is bound up with adjusting the construction of a turn to convey what one means to convey or to accomplish the action a speaker means to perform. Sometimes such adjustments involve quite radical changes to the character of a turn, as in #11, and sometimes they may involve some fine tuning of a turn's import. Here are just two instances illustrating such fine tuning.

#16 [Holt:SO88(II):1:3:1]

- 1 Les: .hhhh I RANG you up-(.) ah: think it wz la:s' night. But
 2 + you were- (.) u-were you ↑ou:t? Or: was it the night
 3 be↓fore per↓haps.

#17 [Holt:SO88(II):1:3:4]

- 1 Hal: . . we stopped at a place called Chil'm.
 2 (0.2)
 3 Les: .t.hh ↑↑Qh yes it's beautiful ↓the:re [↑i s n' t i t.=
 4 Hal: [Isn't it lovely=
 5 Les: =At leas' it wa:s, he|h heh hu
 6 Hal: [A h : we only: we only (.) k- uh wuh
 7 eh w- e-stopped there purely by chance. We were doin'
 8 be↓d b[rɛakfas[ts, [but
 9 Les: + [.hhhh [.hhh[We you see the fam- the funny thing is
 10 my: family ↓come partly from Chil'm,

When in line 2 of #16 Lesley replaces *you were* with *were you*, she changes what had been going to be a statement/assertion into a question, thereby contributing to the way

the turn is designed to indicate uncertainty about which night she called. In #17 Hal is describing a holiday visit to a part of England from which Lesley comes; after this excerpt she goes on to tell a story touched off by Hal's mentioning the very village (Chilham, in line 1) from which she originates. When in line 9 she breaks off to insert *the funny thing is* (and in so doing, substitutes *my family for the family*) she manages a certain kind of connection with Hal's reference to Chilham, one of coincidence. Through these self-repairs the speaker adjusts the design of the turn so as to better fit the turn's project and more effectively to convey what she means to.

Of course self-repair is also a mechanism for remedying mistakes in conversation, where a speaker has conveyed precisely what she meant, but in circumstances where what she thereby claimed is somehow in error. Here is a brief example: Fran is arranging to drive her daughter down to stay with Ted's family who are staying at the beach, and Ted has just given her their address at Ocean Boulevard, Newport.

#18 [NB:III:6]

- 1 Fran: Oh::: Wih gee isn't at funny gee I'm going down
 2 t' see somebody they're going do:wn the end a'
 3 this month et twunty seven hundred- .hhh Ocean
 4 Fro::nt.
 5 (0.7)
 6 Fran: Is that a diffrent pl:ce then Newpo:rt?
 7 Ted: M-hm I gue:ss, this is, Balboa Penninsula.

Through just the same device as Lesley used in #17 to portray the connection to Chilham as a coincidence, that is, depicting something as funny, Fran claims in the first line of #18 a coincidence between Ted's address and one she's going to at the end of the month (coincidence in the sense of her figuring the addresses are somehow adjacent, or in the same area). It turns out she's wrong; her turn in line 6 is a form of self-repair (realizing that the addresses may be in quite different areas). This instance closely resembles the kinds of back downs that Pomerantz (1984) noted speakers may do when recipients withhold agreeing with their initial claims or assessments—as Ted does here, when he does not respond to Fran's claim about the coincidence, resulting in the pause shown in line 5. Although Fran repaired her own mistake, that repair was initiated by Ted's withholding (and incidentally the need for it is confirmed by him, in line 7). Although Fran completed the repair (hence self-repair), it was initiated by her coparticipant (other-initiated self repair).

Speakers may also recognize from the recipient's response that the meaning of what they said was not clear or was misunderstood. Insofar as a recipient's response reveals how he or she understood the speaker's prior turn, the speaker can discern from that response whether the recipient's understanding is in some respect problematic—as we saw Emma found Mary's response to her invitation to be in #11. One solution may be to repair the misunderstanding in third position in a sequence, for instance by clarifying something in their initial turn that was misunderstood. A case Schegloff discusses is the following.

- #19 [CDHQ:1:52] (from Schegloff, 1992b)
- 1 Annie: Which one::s are closed, an' which ones are open.
 2 Zeb: Most of 'em. This, this, [this, this ((pointing))
 3 Annie: [I 'ont mean on the shelters,
 4 I mean on the roads.
 5 Zeb: Oh
 6 (8.0)
 7 Zeb: Closed, those're the ones you wanna know about,

In the design of her initial turn in the fragment, Annie referred to whatever she's asking about deictically, *Which ones*. This turns out to be the source of trouble: She finds from Zeb's response (line 2) that what she meant has been problematically understood, a trouble she remedies by clarifying what she meant by *ones* (i.e., roads, not shelters; Schegloff, 1992b, p. 1303).

In that example, Zeb responded on the basis of a particular understanding of what he took Annie to have meant by *Which ones*. The problematic understanding and its source became apparent to her in the response he made. Of course, recipients can have trouble constructing an appropriate response in the first place, because they have problems of one sort or another in understanding the speaker's initial turn. Hence they may initiate repair in their next turn, that is, the turn immediately following the one in which the trouble source occurred. Here are two relatively perspicuous cases.

- #20 [Hol:88U:1:8:9] (Gordon and Dana are students studying at the same college)
- 1 Gordon: 'Ave you drop' some biology notes.
 2 (0.4)
 3 Dana: + Have I wha[t them.
 4 Gordon: [.hh.hhh Dropped theh-them. Los:t.
 5 Dana: Why[:?
 6 Gordon: [Mislai:d.
- #21 [NB:IV:5:2] (Emma is going to call over to collect the newspaper that Gladys has offered her)
- 1 Emma: Well [th:a:nk you dear I'll be o:ver.
 2 Gladys: [So u- eh
 3 Gladys: Alright dear a:nd uh front er back.h
 4 (1.0)
 5 Emma: + Wu:t?
 6 (.)
 7 Emma: .h[huh
 8 Gladys: [I s[ay f-
 9 Emma: [OH: : : : AH GUESS th' FRO:nt. be better?

In examples #20 and #21, the recipients, Dana and Emma respectively, were at first (at least in Emma's case) unable to respond because of something problematic about their understanding of the first speaker's initial turn. In this respect, then, there was a failure

in the design of those initial turns insofar as their design failed to enable them to be understood in the way the first speaker wished them to be understood—a breakdown in mutual understanding or intersubjectivity or in the accountability of conduct. The following example is a little more complex, but essentially also illustrates how a problematic understanding can arise from the design of an initial turn. Lesley is telling Joyce about her afternoon's shopping.

- #22 [Holt:M88:1:2:6]
- 1 Les: .pk An' I got s'm nice cott'n ↑to:ps: I'm
2 not g'nna [tell Skip] .hhh
- 3 Joy: [↑Oh did ↓y]ou:
4 Les: Ye::s. u-I meant (.) only to get one or two .hhh but
5 they're- (0.2) iyou kno:w I mean if I stock up ↓now
6 then I don't need t'do it again do I
7 hhe[h heh h]a-[: .hhhhh
- 8 Joy: + [Ye:↓ah.] [°Ri:ght,°
9 Les: Yes.[°()°
- 10 Joy: + [Oh weh:- what (.) duh-aa-ou:ter-: wear: tops you
11 mean
12 Les: .hhh Well no: some I c'n wear underneath:.
13 Joy: ↑Oh:.
14 Les: You see::? d-against my skin,hh
15 Joy: Oh::,

In contrast to the recipients in #20 and #21, here Joyce does initially respond to Lesley's report about buying some nice cotton tops, but her response (in line 8) already displays some uncertainty. Lesley seeks confirmation (support for) her account for stocking up, when at the end of line 6 she asks "do I". A strongly supportive confirmation of that might take the form of a partial elliptical repeat, something along the lines of *No you don't*, or *That's right you don't* (or even the highly elliptical *That's right*). Instead Joyce's response in line 8 consists of two quite minimal acknowledgements, which do not readily or enthusiastically confirm Lesley's account. Neither does she reciprocate Lesley's pronounced chuckling laughter in line 7; she appears not to have seen what's amusing. Joyce does not respond with any conviction to Lesley's report about what she bought (her *Yeah* and *right* in line 8 are articulated softly, with downward intonation on the first, and the second spoken especially quietly); neither does she confirm or support Joyce's account for stocking up.

The nature of Joyce's uncertainty in line 8 becomes apparent in her subsequent turn (lines 10/11), from which it emerges that she's unsure now what it was that Lesley bought. In her repair initiation, "*Oh weh:- what (.) duh-aa-ou:ter-: wear: tops you mean*," she returns to the first part of Lesley's report, the part to which she had earlier responded with conviction (*Oh did you?* in line 3). Her uncertainty in lines 10/11 is reflected both in the repair initiation itself, which takes the form of *What, x you mean?* as an attempted understanding of what Lesley had bought; and in the delivery of the repair initiation, including the false start and the articulation of "*ou:ter-:*" (the transcription only inadequately captures the abrupt halting, almost foreclosure, of the word she is offering as her understanding of what Lesley meant).

Joyce's uncertainty arises from some incongruity in the design of Lesley's report, which it is unnecessary to detail here (for an explication of this, see Drew, forthcoming). The example serves simply to offer further illustration of how the practices associated with the initiation and management of repair are the principal means through which failures, or potential failures, in the mutuality of understanding—in intersubjectivity—are remedied. Hence the organization of repair is the means by which the coherent articulation between turn design, action, and sequence is maintained (for an authoritative explication of this, see Schegloff, 1992b).

CONCLUSION

It has not been possible in such a brief overview to say anything about the methodology of CA; in any case, it might be misleading to suggest that there is one methodology, when in reality there are certain differences and diversities in the ways in which conversation analysts work. However, it is perhaps worth summarizing this in broad terms as the investigation of the practices, devices, and patterns through which participants construct their verbal conduct (turns at talk) and arrive at understandings of one another's talk during the back-and-forth interaction between them, and how they construct their turns at talk so as to be appropriately responsive to prior turns. In this way, conversation can be regarded as a coconstruction (Jacoby & Ochs, 1995) between participants. CA's methodology is naturalistic and largely qualitative, and it is characterized by four key features:

- Research is based on the study of naturally occurring data (audio and video recordings). These recordings are usually transcribed in considerable detail, though the precise level and type of detail (e.g., whether certain phonetic or prosodic features of production are included) will depend on the particular research focus.
- Phenomena in the data are generally not coded. The reason for this is that tokens that appear to be the same may, on closer inspection, turn out to have a different interactional salience, and hence not to be equivalent. For example, repetitions might be coded in the same category, and hence regarded as undifferentiated phenomena. But different prosodic realizations of repeats (Couper-Kuhlen, 1996), or differences in the sequential circumstances in which something is repeated and in specifically what object is repeated (Schegloff, 1996c), can all crucially influence the activity being conducted through repetitions. Coding tokens on the basis of certain manifest similarities runs the risk of collecting in the same category objects that in reality have quite different interactional significance.
- CA's methodology is generally not quantitative. This is not a rigid precept, but rather a corollary of the risks attendant on coding, following from which it is clear that quantifying the occurrence of a certain object is likely to result in the truly interactional properties of the object being overlooked. Those interactional properties can be uncovered only by thorough qualitative analysis, particularly of the sequential properties of that object, and how variations in speech production are related to their different sequential implicatures (on reasons for being cautious about, or avoiding, quantification, see Schegloff, 1993).

- CA's methods attempt to document and explicate how participants arrived at understandings of one another's action during the back-and-forth interaction between them, and how in turn they constructed their turns so as to respond to prior turn(s). So CA focuses especially on those features of talk that are salient to participants' analyses of one another's turns at talk, in the progressive unfolding of interactions.

Just as it has not been possible to give any thorough account of the methodology of CA, neither has it been possible to give any account of the scope and diversity of its substantive investigations and findings. An outstanding bibliographical source of information about CA research is to be found on the web site that Paul ten Have maintains (<http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/emca/resource.htm>). Ten Have's book *Doing Conversation Analysis: A Practical Guide* (1999) is also a particularly useful overview.

REFERENCES

- Auer, P. (1996). On the prosody and syntax of turn-continuations. In E. Couper-Kuhlen & M. Selting (Eds.), *Prosody in conversation: Interactional studies* (pp. 57–100). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bergmann, J. (1993). *Discreet indiscretions: The social organization of gossip*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
- Brown, R. (1958). *Words and things: An introduction to language*. New York: The Free Press.
- Clift, R. (2001). Meaning in interaction: the case of 'actually'. *Language*, 77, 245–291.
- Couper-Kuhlen, E. (1996). The prosody of repetition: on quoting and mimicry. In E. Couper-Kuhlen & M. Selting (Eds.), *Prosody in conversation: Interactional studies* (pp. 366–405). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davidson, J. (1984). Subsequent versions of invitations, offers, requests and proposals dealing with potential or actual rejection. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis* (pp. 102–128). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Drew, P. (1997). 'Open' class repair initiators in response to sequential sources of trouble in conversation. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 28, 69–101.
- Drew, P. (forthcoming). Is confusion a state of mind? In H. ten Molder & J. Potter (Eds.), *Conversation and cognition: Perspectives and arguments*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Drew, P., & Heritage, J. (Eds.). (1992). *Talk at work*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Drew, P., & Holt, E. (1998). Figures of speech: Idomatic expressions and the management of topic transition in conversation. *Language in Society*, 27, 495–523.
- Drew, P., & Sorjonen, M.-L. (1997). Institutional dialogue. In T. v. Dijk (Ed.), *Discourse: A multidisciplinary introduction: Vol. 2. Discourse as social interaction in society* (pp. 92–118). London: Sage.
- Ford, C. E., & Thompson, S. A. (1996). Interactional units in conversation: Syntactic, intonational and pragmatic resources for the management of turns. In E. Ochs, E. A. Schegloff, & S. A. Thompson (Eds.), *Interaction and grammar* (pp. 134–184). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Gardner, R. (1997). The conversation object Mm: a weak and variable acknowledging token. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 30, 131–156.
- Goodwin, C. (1981). *Conversational organization: Interaction between speakers and hearers*. New York: Academic Press.
- Goodwin, C. (1984). Notes on story structure and the organization of participation. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 225–246). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, C. (1995). Co-constructing meaning in conversations with an aphasic man. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 28, 233–260.
- Goodwin, M. H. (1982). 'Instigating': Storytelling as social process. *American Ethnologist*, 9, 799–819.
- Heritage, J. (1984a). *Garfinkel and ethnomethodology*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

- Heritage, J. (1984b). A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential placement. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 299–345). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Heritage, J. (1997). Conversation analysis and institutional talk: Analyzing data. In D. Silverman (Ed.), *Qualitative analysis: Issues of theory and method* (pp. 161–182). London: Sage.
- Heritage, J. (1998). Oh-prefaced responses to inquiry. *Language in Society*, 27, 291–334.
- Heritage, J. (2002). Oh-prefaced responses to assessments: A method of modifying agreement/disagreement. In C. Ford, B. Fox, & S. Thompson (Eds.), *The language of turn and sequence* (pp. 196–224). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Holt, E. (1996). Reporting on talk: The use of direct reported speech in conversation. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 29, 219–245.
- Hutchby, I. (1998). *Conversation and technology*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Jacoby, S., & Ochs, E. (1995). Co-construction: An introduction. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 28, 171–183.
- Jefferson, G. (1978). Sequential aspects of storytelling in conversation. In J. Schenkein (Ed.), *Studies in the organization of conversational interaction* (pp. 219–248). New York: Academic Press.
- Jefferson, G. (1984). On stepwise transition from talk about a trouble to inappropriately next-positioned matters. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 191–221). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Jefferson, G. (1986). On the interactional unpacking of a 'gloss.' *Language in Society*, 14, 435–466.
- Jefferson, G. (1988). On the sequential organization of troubles-talk in ordinary conversation. *Social Problems*, 35(4), 418–441.
- Lerner, G. (1992). Assisted storytelling: Deploying shared knowledge as a practical matter. *Qualitative Sociology*, 15, 247–271.
- Lerner, G. (2002). Turn-sharing: The choral co-production of talk-in-interaction. In C. Ford, B. Fox, & S. Thompson (Eds.), *The language of turn and sequence* (pp. 225–256). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Mandelbaum, J. (1987). Couples sharing stories. *Communication Quarterly*, 35, 144–170.
- Maynard, D. (1989). Perspective-display sequences in conversation. *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, 53, 91–113.
- Pomerantz, A. (1984). Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: Some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis* (pp. 57–101). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pomerantz, A. (1986). Extreme case formulations: A way of legitimizing claims. *Human Studies*, 9, 219–229.
- Pomerantz, A. M. (1980). Telling my side: 'Limited access' as a 'fishing' device. *Sociological Inquiry*, 50, 186–98.
- Sacks, H. (1984). Notes on methodology. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 21–27, edited by Gail Jefferson from various lectures). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Sacks, H. (1986). Some considerations of a story told in ordinary conversation. *Poetics*, 15, 127–138.
- Sacks, H. (1992). *Lectures on conversation: Vol. 2* (Fall 1968–Spring 1972). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Sacks, H., & Schegloff, E. A. (1979). Two preferences in the organization of reference to persons and their interaction. In G. Psathas (Ed.), *Everyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology* (pp. 15–21). New York: Irvington.
- Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. *Language*, 50, 696–735.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1979). The relevance of repair for syntax-for-conversation. In T. Givon (Ed.), *Syntax and semantics 12: Discourse and syntax* (pp. 261–288). New York: Academic Press.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1980). Preliminaries to preliminaries: "Can I ask you a question." *Sociological Inquiry*, 50, 104–152.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1988). On an actual virtual servo-mechanism for guessing bad news: A single case conjecture. *Social Problems*, 35, 442–457.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1992a). Introduction. In G. Jefferson (Ed.), *Harvey Sacks, lectures on conversation: Vol. 1* (Fall 1964–Spring 1968, pp. ix–lxii). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1992b). Repair after next turn: The last structurally provided for place for the defense of intersubjectivity in conversation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95, 1295–1345.

- Schegloff, E. A. (1993). Reflections on quantification in the study of conversation. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 26, 99–128
- Schegloff, E. A. (1996a). Issues of relevance for discourse analysis: Contingency in action, interaction and co-participant context. In E. H. Hovy & D. R. Scott (Eds.), *Computational and conversational discourse: burning issues—an interdisciplinary account* (pp. 3–35). New York: Springer.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1996b). Turn organization: One intersection of grammar and interaction. In E. Ochs, S. Thompson, & E. Schegloff (Eds.), *Interaction and grammar* (pp. 52–133). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1996c). Confirming allusions: Toward an empirical account of action. *American Journal of Sociology*, 104, 161–216.
- Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G., & Sacks, H. (1977). The preference for self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation. *Language*, 53, 361–382.
- Ten Have, P. (1999). *Doing conversation analysis: A practical guide*. London: Sage.
- Wootton, A. (1997). *Interaction and the development of mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.